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Meeting of Guatemalan Group
Friday, June 11, 1954

Present: Holland, Dreier, Jamison, Pawley, Wieland, Clark, Barron, Sanders, Warren, Holcomb, Burrows, Leddy, Pearson, Woodward, Atwood

1. Draft Resolution

(a) It was agreed that Holland would ask the following LA Ambassadors to a luncheon at Pawley's farm on Saturday to work out the preamble and thetext of the draft resolution: Nicaragua, Salvador, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela and Honduras (all of which could safely be considered as approving the text) and Brasil, Mexico and Uruguay (who have been authorized to negotiate on the preamble) and Argentina.

(b) Burrows was to phone Willauer to let us know by Monday morning whether Honduras will or will not approve the text.

(c) While Venezuela has presented suggested changes (memo from Warren to Holland), she will go along with the text of the resolution even if these changes are not made. Venezuela's main concern is Costa Rica.

(d) Atwood was to cable Kemper to ask him to explain to Rau or Vargas why our Ambassadors in Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile had already made their approaches before the Brazilian emissary arrived and to get Brazilian agreement to the draft resolution. Atwood was to cable Sparks to stay at LaPaz until he gets agreement to the draft resolution; also, he is authorized to tell the Bolivians that 10 states now agree to the text.

(e) Jamison was to send a circular instruction to our Embassies indicating the support thus far obtained for the text of the draft resolution.

2. Consultation with LA Ambassadors at UN

(a) Dreier reported that USUN had been instructed to circulate among the LA Ambassadors in New York and explain the Guatemalan problem.

(b) Key, after consulting Lodge, was to call Holland regarding the desirability of the latter holding a dinner in New York for the LA Ambassadors to the UN.

3. Calling of Meeting and Conduct of Meeting

(a) It was agreed to have as many as possible sign the letter calling for the OAS meeting; letter to be signed alphabetically.

(b) It was agreed that Holland and Dreier would work out with the OAS Ambassadors the text of the letter calling for the meeting. Quintanilla was viewed as the only real problem among the OAS Ambassadors.

(c) It was agreed that the order of precedence of the Council would be followed with respect to statements made before the Council on the calling of the meeting. In connection with this discussion, Holland emphasized that our approach must be the broad one that we are faced with a threat of world Communism

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to this hemisphere rather than a Guatemalan threat to the Central American countries.

(d) The letter calling the meeting was to indicate that while Guatemala was not legally entitled to attend (not having ratified the Rio Treaty) she is nevertheless invited.

4. Membership of Delegation - Holland stated that the fact that the resolution will already be approved before the meeting means that we will not need a large delegation at Montevideo. His off-hand estimate was a total of 11, which would include no Congressmen. It was agreed that Jamison would work with the Secretary's staff and others in shaping up the delegation. Pauley's suggestion that some people may be sent in advance and attached to the Embassy was accepted.

5. Anticipating Guatemalan Maneuvers

Wieland reported in general that this program of smearing Guatemalan maneuvers in advance was proceeding satisfactorily.

6. Economic Measures

(a) At Holland's appearance before the House LA Subcommittee, some Congressmen, including Javits and Bolton, agreed to make statements.

(b) Holland believed that since we had the agreement of so many countries now, statements on our economic policy were not so essential, but the group agreed that if the meeting was to be successful we would have to avoid any significant adverse developments along this line. For example, Senator Walker's effort to block shipment of the Czech steel mill to Argentina.

7. Preparation of Case

(a) It was agreed that we would not get too much help from the other Central American countries with respect to the evidence they can contribute to the case.

(b) Dreier is already in touch with Zuleta and Seville-Sacasa to obtain their help on the case. Holland indicated that Mora wants to work and that Munis should also be cut in.

8. Publicity

(a) Guidance memo for USIA in the event of a break in the draft resolution has been submitted to Holland for approval.

(b) USIA is preparing LA opinion summaries for public affairs guidance.

(c) USIA is playing the White House release on the strengthening of the Eximbank.

(d) Clark reported that VOA writers are being briefed to get our story across to the other regions of the world.

(e) Secretary's Seattle speech including the UFCO matter has been sent out.

(f)

(f) Wieland reported that while important editorial writers have taken our material, no prominent citizens in any of the countries have agreed yet to make any statements. Warren believed that at least for 7 or 8 countries no such statements could be made until the governments had approved.

(g) The delivery of 50 Brazilian training planes via Guatemala, flown by Brazilians, was to receive publicity.

(h) Clark was to consider what additional public affairs staff we can put in Montevideo to help out on propaganda in Uruguay. Mora had expressed particular interest in receiving this kind of help.

(i) Wieland was to consider in what way Romualdi or the CMLT could be induced to issue helpful statements.

(j) Herron was to get a message to Penrifoy to obtain pictures and any inflamatory pamphlets, etc., of a demonstration called for Guatemala City on Saturday.

(k) Holland told Wieland that we should play the line that the constitutional guarantees in Guatemala are gone.

(l) Play was to be given to the Facio statement and Figueres was supposed to make a statement on Guatemala today.

(m) The decision remains not to give out the background briefs to the press here.

(n) Holland asked Wieland to develop statistics relating to the great decline of Guatemalan coffee sales with particular emphasis to grass root episodes. The Government must stay out of it and there must be no organized boycott.

(o) Holland reminded the group that any speeches, including those prepared for Congressmen, must be cleared with Wieland or Herron.

9. Navy Operations

Leddy reported that instructions to the Navy have been clarified.

10. Participation of the Secretary

(a) It appears that the Secretary will be available for the meeting from July 1-5.

(b) Holland agreed to talk with McJennett on material for the Secretary's speech at the OAS meeting. McJennett was to work closely with Sanders on the speech.

(c) Jamison was to develop all necessary information relating to travel time, plane arrangements, etc., for the Secretary

11. Delivery of Arms to Costa Rica

After discussion, it was decided that arms would not be delivered to Costa Rica until after the OAS meeting. Pasley and Burrows are handling the problem vis-a-vis Defense and the Costa Ricans.

ARA:RWPearson:vss